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POSTSCRIPTS

Obscenity: A Separate Standard for
Minors
In response to a number of decisions
pertaining to obscenity regulations, The
Catholic Lawyer published a symposium
in its Autumn, 1964 issue entitled "Obscenity and the Law." In "Obscenity
Control and Minors-The Case for a
Separate Standard,"' Dr. Edward T.
Fagan, Professor of Law at St. John's
University School of Law and Editor of
The Catholic Lawyer, advocated that a
separate standard should be recognized
for the determination of what constitutes
suppressible obscene material with respect
to minors.
In People v. Bookcase, Inc.,2 the New
York Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional a statute which was intended
to provide protection solely for minors,
against those who sought to distribute
obscene material to them for profit. Commenting upon this case, Dr. Fagan stated
that:

The net result . . . has been to leave

the children of New York State almost
completely vulnerable to the poison dispensed by those who traffic in obscenity
for profit. It is imperative, therefore, that
all responsible members of the community
take immediate action to reestablish appropriate legal safeguards for children
3
against this danger.
It was proposed that a separate obscenity standard could best be established
through the state's right to limit the first
amendment freedoms of children in protection of public morality. Dr. Fagan
contended that although there was conflicting evidence of the causal relationship
between constant exposure of children to
obscene materials and moral degeneracy
and juvenile delinquency, nevertheless, the
legislature could justifiably act in this
area "despite the fact that it results in
some curtailment of adult freedom of
4

press."

Reacting to the need for legislation in
this area, New York enacted two Sections
3

10 CATHOLIC LAW. 270 (1964).
2 14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d
433 (1964).

Fagan, Obscenity Control and Minors-The

Case for a Separate Standard,
LAW. 270, 271 (1964).
4Id. at 278.
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of the Penal Law, 484-h and 484-i, dealing with the problem of preventing
minors from being exposed to harmful
or pornographic materials.
In Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick,5 plaintiffs, a retail bookstore and its president,
attacked these statutes. It was conceded
that the particular book which the plaintiffs intended to continue selling, "The
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" by
John Cleland (popularly known as "Fanny
Hill"), contained "details, descriptions
or narrative accounts of acts of sexual
intercourse and 'is embraced within the
scope and intendment of said statutes.'

"'6

The court, in upholding the constitutionality of the sections in question, stated
that:
A statute which prohibits the sale to
minors of matter which is not obscene
in the hands of adults, but which is
deemed harmful to children, would (always assuming it was carefully drawn)
be constitutional. Whether justification is
sought by redefining obscenity in terms
of its impact on the young so that there
are in effect two standards of obscenity,
or whether it is done without regard
to the traditional legal concept, "obscenity," the state has a legitimate interest
in preventing the dissemination of material
deemed harmful to children. Contrary to
plaintiffs' assertions, the Federal Constitution, and specifically the First Amendment thereof, does not secure to children
the same, almost absolute, right assured
to adults to judge and determine for
themselves what they may read and what
they should reject.7

5 267 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1965).
6 Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 267 N.Y.S.2d
415, 417 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
7 Id. at 418.
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The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
challenge to the constitutionality of these
sections, based solely on the contention
that the state cannot interfere with the
plaintiffs' right to sell books on the basis
of the age of the purchaser, was meritless.8
Thus, the court has in effect recognized
Dr. Fagan's proposals-that there be a
separate classification, in law, of minors
as a prospective audience for obscenity;
and that there be a separate standard for
the determination of what is suppressible
obscene material with respect to such
minors.
Dr. Fagan also provided suggestions
and caveats to draftsmen for the formulation of this separate standard. 9 In addition, he explored possible collateral aids
to implement the enforcement of such a
separate standard, once it had been
statutorily defined. One such aid would
be a permanent advisory committee, to be
established by the state or municipality,
and staffed by qualified legal, psychological and sociological experts in the field
"This committee
of obscenity control.
would function primarily as an advisory
board to law enforcement officials, indicating to them what, in its opinion, would
be adult-level material in the current book
market."1 0
It was recognized that such a committee
might well be attacked as an illegal prior
restraint, since its determination of obscenity would be made in advance of any
hearing on the question. Yet, it was
noted, that a prior restraint was not per
8 Ibid.
0
"I

Supra note 3, at 281-82.
Id. at 282-83.
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se prohibited: "Given a justified reason
for such legislation, coupled with adequate
constitutional safeguards, such legislation
would probably be held not to violate
constitutional safeguards."" One necessary safeguard would be "a provision for
an appeal from the committee's determination."'" These views have received
general support in a recent Supreme Court
case which held that pre-showing censorship of motion pictures was not proscribed, so long as the statute included

a provision for prompt, judicial review of
1 3
the censor's actions.
With the judicial recognition of a separate standard of obscenity for minors in
New York, the present area of concern
is enforcement. While the opinion of an
advisory committee will not preclude judicial review, nevertheless, it will function
effectively in removing from the courts
the burden of passing on every item of
literature on an ad hoc basis.
12

'

14

Id. at 283.

Effect of Psychological Factors in
Custody Proceedings
A recent issue of The Catholic Lawyer
cited the increased criticism of child
custody proceedings by legal scholars.'
It was the contention of the experts that
"court battles often lose sight of the goal
of the law, viz., to satisfy the best interests
of the child." 2 A controversial Iowa custody case, Painter v. Bannister,:' has recently been the recipient of much censure
from the mass media.4 In that case, the
father, a widower, requested the aid of
his deceased wife's parents in caring for
his five year old son. The grandparents
willingly accepted custody of the child.
Seventeen months later, the father, having
remarried, sought the return of his son,
but this request was refused.
III
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51

(1965).

Ibid.
140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
-l
owa-,
4 "The Iowa Supreme Court acted this week to
insure 7 year-old Mark Painter a 'conventional,
2

Ibid.
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.' 51 (1965).

The Supreme Court of Iowa sustained
the claim of the grandparents, and held
that the divergent philosophies of life of
the father and the grandparents were
important as they related to the child
and his special needs." The Court relied
heavily upon the testimony of a psychologist that the child was emotionally unstable and that his best interests would
be served if he remained in the custody
of his grandparents.'
The Court contrasted the conventional
middle-class,
Middle
West
background.'
. . . The Supreme Court's opinion . . . came
out for traditional virtues and expressed the
view that if the child's lot were cast with his
father and stepmother he might be exposed to
an 'arty, Bohemian' life." N. Y. Times, Feb.
13, 1966, p. 50, col. 1; see Lee, Iowa Judge
Raps City Life, N. Y. Sunday News, March 6,
1966, § 2, p. 1; Choosing Parents in Iowa,
Time, Feb. 25, 1966, p. 45; Battle for a Little
Boy, Life, March 4, 1966, p. 101.
.,
Iowa
,
.,Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154 (1966).
6Id. at, 140 N.W.2d at 156.

12
Midwestern environment supplied by the
grandparents with what it termed the
"arty, Bohemian" life of the father, and
concluded that the former would be more
conducive to the emotional well-being of
7
the child.
The "best interests" of the child have
always been controlling in the determination of custody suits in American courts."
Generally, when the dispute is between
a parent and a third party, the natural
right of the parent will prevail.9 Any
presumption of parental preference may
be rebutted, however, by establishing the
presence of an exceptional circumstance,
such as the parent's unfitness10 or the prolonged residence of the child with the
contesting third party. 1 In addition, a
concern for the psychological health of
the child is both desirable and necessary
in making a reasonable decision as to his
best interests." 2
In the instant case, the Court admitted
that the father was a fit parent,'" but
awarded custody to the grandparents after
the child had lived with them for two
4
and one-half years.'
It was the opinion of the psychologist
who testified at the trial that a change in
7

Id. at -,

8 MADDEN,

140 N.W.2d at 158.
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371 (1931).
9 Simpson, The Unfit Parent, 39 U. DET. L.J.
347, 357 (1962).
10 See MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 372.
11 See, e.g., Henry v. Janes, 222 Ark. 89, 257

S.W.2d 285 (1953);

State ex rel. Rys v. Vor-

licek, 229 Minn. 497, 40 N.W.2d 350 (1949).
12 Note, Child Custody Disputes, 73 YALE L.J.

151, 157 (1963).
'.

Painter v. Bannister, supra note 5, at

140 N.W.2d at 154.

14The child had been with his grandparents
less than two years at the commencement of
the action. Id. at -,
140 N.W.2d at 153.
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custody was untimely inasmuch as any
disruption at this critical point in the boy's
life "would be detrimental to the child
...The Court reasoned that a return
to the custody of the father under these
circumstances would be likely to result in
a "seriously disrupting and disturbing
effect upon the child's development. ..."
Such an unusual cause and effect relationship, that a return to the parent would
be detrimental to the child, would seem
to qualify this case as one characterized
by an exceptional circumstance.
Thus, it can be seen that, despite the
heavy criticism the Painter opinion has
drawn, it does not in fact represent any
radical departure from established precedent. The Court attempted to make
clear that it was not the father's unconventional way of life which was the basis
of the decision. "It is not our prerogative
to determine custody upon our choice of
one of two ways of life within normal
17
and proper limits and we will not do so.'
Clearly, the Court preferred the home of
the grandparents,18 but despite its personal
views concerning child development, it
awarded custody primarily on the grounds
of the child's "psychological best interests
in order to achieve the goal of maximization of the child's welfare."' 19
-, 140 N.W.2d at 157.
t6id. at -,
140 N.W.2d at 156.
17 Id. at -,
140 N.W.2d at 154.
J;"Were the question simply which household
would be the most suitable in which to raise
a child, we would have unhesitatingly chosen
the Bannister home. We believe security and
stability in the home are more important
than intellectual stimulation in the proper development of a child." Id. at , 140 N.W.2d
:t
156.
!ISupra note 12.
15Id. at

